A

BRIEF VIEW

OF THE

ANATOMICAL ARGUMENTS

FOR THE DOCTRINE OF

MATERIALISM;

OCCASIONED BY

Dr. FERRIAR's ARGUMENT AGAINST IT.

By WILLIAM TATTERSALL, M. D.

GREAT DANGER ATTENDS EVERY STEP BEYOND DIRECT INFERENCE, IN REASONING CONCERNING THE FACTS OF NEUROLOGY.

FERRIAR.

Surgeon General's Office
Library
No. 54045
Washington, D.C.

LONDON:

PRINTED BY G. WOODFALL, PATERNOSTER-ROW;

FOR J. JOHNSON, NO. 72, ST. PAUL'S CHURCH-YARD.

ADVERTISEMENT.

DR. FERRIAR's Paper, to which the first part of this is an Answer, may be found in Vol. IV. Part I. of the Memoirs of the Literary and Philosophical Society of Manchester.

A

BRIEF VIEW, &c.*

A PERSON who believes the truth, generally believes the importance of any doctrine; but, to ſay nothing of this propenſity, I ſuppoſe it will be allowed, that the doctrine of Materialiſm is connected with ſo many other important doctrines, that it derives importance from them.

An advocate for the doctrine cannot therefore avoid being intereſted, when he finds it attacked; and if its opponents be medical men, he will be more intereſted, becauſe the queſtion is, in ſome ſort, anatomical. For theſe reaſons I was anxious to learn the contents of Dr. Ferriar's paper, and as I can by no means think his argument concluſive, I cannot neglect to anſwer it.

* This doctrine ought rather to be called the doctrine of homogeneity, or homogeneouſneſs.

I could have wiſhed to have entered upon the ſubject without noticing the extraneous matter which Dr. Ferriar has prefixed to his paper; but this matter is ſo evidently addreſſed *ad populum*, and ſo much calculated to engage vulgar prejudices in his favour, that an opponent is obliged to ſhew it to be foreign from the purpoſe.

Of this kind are the two queſtions of the Motto †, which a Materialiſt, as ſuch, is no more inclined to anſwer in the affirmative, than an Immaterialiſt. If conſciouſneſs be preſerved, it is all that we can be anxious about; and we may as eaſily ſuppoſe conſciouſneſs to be reſtorable after death, if it be the property of organized matter, as if it be the property of ſpirit. Of the nature and laws of ſpirit we know nothing, but that, by the very definition, it has no property in common with matter; and that, if it could be ſuppoſed to reſide in matter during life, it could not be ſuppoſed to reſt with the body in the grave.

But the moſt ſerious objection to the Motto is, that it is calculated to deter timid and

† The Motto is,
An toti morimur? Nullaque pars manet Noſtri?

ſuperſtitious minds from free inquiry, by a regard to the conſequences. The firſt maxim of every true philoſopher is to follow truth where ever ſhe may lead him. It is ſurely no fair argument againſt any opinion, to point out its ſuppoſed conſequences; if the opinion be true, they will be ſuch as they ought to be; and he who advances the opinion has the beſt right to draw his concluſions from it. I have the ſame objections to the beautiful lines quoted from Jortin, at the end of the paper. But to proceed;

Dr. F. ſays, "though I conſider the medi-
"cal facts as almoſt demonſtrating that the
"brain is the inſtrument only, not the cauſe
"of the reaſoning power, I entertain no hope
"of their converting one thorough Materi-
"aliſt." Why not? If the argument be good, is a Materialiſt leſs open to conviction than any other perſon? Such an inſinuation, I am perſuaded, Dr. F. cannot mean to throw out. He adds, "Hypotheſis is a miſtreſs not eaſily abandoned." This is very true; but I ſhould have thought that there would have been greater propriety in a Materialiſt, whoſe doctrine is more modern, applying ſuch an obſervation to an Immaterialiſt. The doc-

trine of immateriality has certainly a more hypothetical appearance; it is what we have all been taught from infancy; it therefore gained prior poſſeſſion of the mind, and may be ſuppoſed not to be "eaſily abandoned."

The ſtory of Democritus and his figs is moſt unluckily introduced, for, ſo far as we can draw any analogy from it, the analogy is this, that man, perceiving his ability to think, makes "a problem of the incident, and proceeds to ſolve it," by the ſuppoſition of an immaterial principle; when the anatomiſt confeſſes that he can account for the faculty of thinking in a much more probable manner, by the diſſection of the brain, and by a compariſon of man with other animals. "If a "philoſopher be enraged, and complain that "by this familiar explanation he is deprived "of a more important cauſe *of his own inven-* "*tion*," I cannot help it.

I think that the writers who "ſeem to "have inherited the ſpirit of the old Grecian "in the preſent conteſt," have been the advocates for immateriality; and that they are the perſons who "have run their metaphy- "ſical career without ſtopping to enquire for "facts."

If I conſider either the perſons who have defended Materialiſm, or the ability with which they have conducted the defence of it, I cannot think that a quotation from Homer, reſpecting boys deſcribing fanciful figures upon ſand, and wantonly deſtroying them again, is applicable to ſuch men, or to their writings.

Dr. F. aſſerts, that "many of the Materi-"aliſts have reckoned their doctrine eſta-"bliſhed, becauſe ſome abſurd theories of "their adverſaries were overthrown; that "they have accumulated their ſtrength againſt "defenceleſs points, and have thought it a "complete victory, to triumph, like Cali-"gula, over rubbiſh and ſand." I do not know which of the Materialiſts he can refer to, but we may be certain that the principal writers on this ſide of the queſtion he cannot refer to. The hydra of prejudice, which they have attacked, is made of "ſterner ſtuff" than "rubbiſh and ſand;" and except that, according to Horace, virtue alone confers the true diadem, they have not the ſlighteſt reſemblance to Caligula.

I am ſincerely ſorry to have had occaſion for theſe remarks. Dr. Ferriar's introductory obſerva-

obſervations might have ſome more propriety when addreſſed to an old acquaintance, and written in the ſportiveneſs of intimate friendſhip ‡; but they are certainly improper in an author, writing gravely upon a metaphyſical ſubject, and appearing before the bar of the public. I ſhould not however have noticed them, had I not been convinced that they coincide with, and tend to confirm, prejudices yet unſubdued §. They throw fuel upon aſhes which ſtill glow; they look like artifices uſed with an intereſted or incompetent jury, in order to beſpeak a favourable verdict.

Dr. F. knows that we have much to do before we can inform ignorance, remove prejudice, and rectify error. In order to make our way through theſe great obſtacles, we ſhould become a firm, and, if poſſible, an impenetrable phalanx. However we may differ in opinion amongſt ourſelves, we ſhould treat each other with the moſt perfect liberality and candour; and never appeal to any paſſion or ſuperſtition, to procure a paltry applauſe, or a ſhort

‡ His paper is addreſſed to Thomas Cooper, Eſq.

§ "The narrowneſs of party yet infeſts philoſophy."—Ferriar's Comments on Sterne.

lived

lived triumph. Thoſe who differ the moſt widely, if they have a ſincere love of truth, may be much better friends to each other than the world will be to them; and ſo far as they promote free inquiry, they will finally promote the ſame cauſe.

Upon the ſubject of his paper Dr. F. argues that ſomething more than the viſible ſtructure of the brain is neceſſary to produce the act of thinking, becauſe, at different times, every part of this "ſtructure has been deeply in-"jured, or totally deſtroyed, without impeding "or changing any part of the proceſs of "thought." I could produce a thouſand teſtimonies from medical authors, of the higheſt authority, to the aſſertion that when the ſtructure of the brain has been injured *the proceſs of thought has been impeded and changed**.

* Doctor Whytt aſſerts, that when the brain is affected, the intellect is affected, and that ſenſe is in proportion to ſenſibility of brain. "In ſome, ſays he, the feelings, per-"ceptions, and paſſions, are naturally dull, ſlow, and diffi-"cult to be rouſed; in others they are very quick and eaſily "excited, *on account of a greater delicacy and ſenſibility of* "*the brain and nerves.*" Whytt, on the Nervous Syſtem, p. 114.

Doctor Whytt was an Immaterialiſt. But whatever he had been, he was much above the ſuſpicion of partiality.

Common

Common paralytic affections are proofs of it; but I ſhall not inſiſt upon them, becauſe the anſwer I give to this part of the argument is this. It is only aſſerted that one part of the ſtructure has been injured at one time, and as I do not undertake to prove that any one part of the brain is more eſſential to perception than another, it only follows that in all theſe caſes the part injured bore ſo ſmall a proportion to the whole as not to affect its power; juſt as I may loſe any finger and yet be ſaid to retain the uſe of the hand. It makes no difference which finger I loſe. I learn from the loſs, that the part bore ſo ſmall a proportion to the whole as not to be eſſential; and if it be urged that I cannot have ſo perfect a uſe of my hand, I acknowledge it; nor can Doctor F. prove that the proceſs of thought was not *as much* impeded or changed by the injury done to any part of the ſtructure of the brain, as the uſe of my hand would be impeded or changed by the loſs of a finger.

Doctor F. ſays, "when the parts of the "brain which in common language, give ori- "gin to the nerves ſupplying thoſe organs, are "injured, the ſenſes are in general propor- "tionably affected." This we all know, and

I ſhould

I ſhould have thought it would have made againſt him; but he ſays, it "ſeems to point "out a difference in the cauſes of thought and "ſenſation." I do not know what he can mean by the cauſes of thought, as diſtinct from the cauſes of ſenſation. Have we any other ideas than thoſe of ſenſation?

Mr. Cooper, fancifully and unfortunately ſeems to make the baſis of the brain the part moſt eſſential to perception. Had he declined ſaying any thing about the part, I apprehend, he would have built his arguments upon a rock, againſt which the floods and the winds might have beat in vain.

Upon the numerous caſes of injury of the brain which Doctor F. has collected, a few remarks may be made, which are applicable to them all.

I. In ſome it appears, *from his own account*, that *the injuries of the brain were followed by injury of the faculties.* In one of the two caſes quoted from Sir J. Pringle, it is ſaid, that the patient was not "*altogether* inſenſible;" and in the other that the patient "had never "been *ſo* inſenſible as not to anſwer reaſon-"ably when ſpoke to." In one of the caſes quoted from Morgagni, an account is given of a diſeaſe

a diſeaſe of the brain, " ſlow in its progreſs, " not affecting the patient's ſenſes *till the laſt*, " and then only by intervals." We muſt ſurely ſuppoſe that this affection of the ſenſes came on gradually, and was in proportion to the diſeaſe. In another of Morgagni's caſes, the patient retained his ſenſes during the *greateſt part* of the time. In another, he was *for the moſt part* ſenſible. In the caſe quoted from Bonnet, the patient ſuffered " no alienation of his facul- " ties till within a very ſhort period before his " death, and was then only delirious at times, " and perfectly ſenſible *during the intervals*."

II. As, in theſe caſes, the injuries of the brain were accompanied with injury of the faculties, is it not a fair inference to ſay that, in the other caſes, the tendency to intellectual, was in exact proportion to the greatneſs of the corporeal injury? If a bottle of wine will intoxicate, is not a ſingle glaſs the road to intoxication? We cannot ſay *a priori* what extent or ſituation of an injury will affect the ſenſes. We only know, from particular caſes, what injuries have been ſuſtained; and we do not perfectly know with what effect. There may be, in caſes of injuries of the brain, as there are in caſes of wounds and

injuries

injuries of the other parts of the body, ſeeming exceptions to the moſt general rules. We ſometimes ſee very ſmall wounds attended with exquiſite pain and imminent danger; and, at other times, we ſee great wounds attended with little pain or danger. This difference depends upon circumſtances which, to any but medical men, it is impoſſible to explain; and which we do not always ourſelves fully comprehend. Yet we do not doubt the tendency of wounds to take away life; and have we any more reaſon to doubt the tendency of injuries of the brain to take away the ſenſes?

III. Nothing can be more looſe and vague, than accounts of perſons retaining their faculties till death. We have frequently ſuch accounts of all perſons who do not die delirious, apoplectic, or idiotical. We have frequently ſuch accounts of perſons who, we know, killed themſelves with drinking and whoring, and we are ſometimes, with equal propriety, informed that they died with truly Chriſtian fortitude. Such accounts may read well in newſpapers, and they may ſooth relatives, but they will neither ſatisfy a phyſician nor a metaphyſician. What faculties were retained?

retained? And in what degree were they retained? If the ſufferer had been a ſtudent, could he ſtudy with his former vigour and application? If he had been remarkable for memory, judgment, or imagination, were they equally ſtrong? In anſwer to theſe queſtions we are informed, that "Diemerbroeck, among "other obſervations of the *little effect* pro- "duced on the mind, by wounds of the brain, "mentions one which came under his own "notice. A young man received a thruſt "with a ſword in the inner canthus of the "eye, which paſſed through the right lateral "ventricle, and ſlanting upwards, almoſt "paſſed through the ſkull at the upper angle "of the Lambdoidal Suture; yet the patient "remained in his uſual ſtate of mind, cum "ſociis convenienter et bono cum judicio "quacunque de re [the weather perhaps] "differens." It is not likely that his companions would propoſe any very abſtruſe ſubjects of converſation, to a young man in ſuch a ſituation. We are farther informed, that he continued in this ſtate "till the tenth day, "when he was carried off by a fever." This fever muſt have been ſome kind of ſymptomatic Phrenitis, and whether it be probable

that

that a young man could converſe "bono cum "judicio *quacunque de re*," while ſuch a fever was forming, the unprejudiced reader will judge. The belief of ſuch an aſſertion requires much better authority than that of Diemerbroeck†. We ſhould remember that the common offices of life, and the common ſubjects of converſation are almoſt mechanical, and that in theſe, the great faculties of the intellect lie nearly dormant; it does not appear whether they are injured or not. A Lunatic will often converſe with rationality, upon all topics which come not home to his feelings. We often ſee men who have much injured their underſtanding, by drinking or other practices, who yet conduct themſelves ſo far according to the rules of common ſenſe and common politeneſs, as to eſcape its being much noticed that they are not what they were. It requires intimate knowledge and very accurate obſervation, it requires experiments, whether a perſon can perform whatever he could have performed, with the ſame ability, to ſay with ſtrict propriety that his

† A curious collection of aſſertions, opinions, and arguments, might be produced from this genius—if it were worth while.

underſtanding is not injured by any injury of the brain.

Doctor F. ſays, that the brain is not known to be a gland; but from diſſections, from analogy, and eſpecially from alternations of ſwellings in the lymphatic glands of the neck, with affections of the head, he muſt think it highly probable that the brain is furniſhed with glands, and therefore "that a ſtate of diſeaſe "is compatible, to a certain degree, with the "exerciſe of its natural functions." Not only chronic inflammation of the liver, but all indolent ſchirrous tumours, and particularly tubercles in the lungs, ſupport this analogical argument.

Doctor F. thinks "the argument would "preſs more ſtrongly againſt materialiſm, if "it could be ſhewed that men can think, with "little, if any, portion of the brain in a ſound "ſtate." He then gives ſome caſes which, he ſays, come nearer to this point; but I do not ſee it; for all that appears from them, in any of the perſons who had been capable of thinking, is that the brain was flaccid, and that its ventricles contained water. Now we ſee numbers of caſes in which the body is flaccid, and its cavities diſtended with water, and yet

the perſon is tolerably capable of doing the common buſineſſes of life—at leaſt as capable as there is any evidence that theſe perſons were of thinking.

But after all, theſe quotations prove nothing, and the refutation of them was not very eſſential to the argument; for they rather make againſt it than for it. As far as they prove that the brain could not be the cauſe, they prove that it could not be the inſtrument of the reaſoning power. In the diſſection of perſons who have died of phthiſis pulmonalis, I have ſeen the greateſt part of the lungs waſted away, and the remaining part much diſeaſed; but does this prove that the lungs are not the organs of reſpiration? or ſhould I throw any light upon the ſubject by ſuppoſing that there was ſome immaterial principle affixed to them, which enabled them to breathe?

The matter appears ſo extremely clear, that when I firſt ſaw Dr. Ferriar's paper, I could not help thinking that he had been amuſing himſelf, and his readers, with an argument which he did not think concluſive. And when I found him aſſerting that he conſidered "the medical facts as almoſt demon-

ſtrating that the brain is the inſtrument only, not the cauſe of the reaſoning power," I was ſurprized. The Monthly Reviewer, I find, has the ſame idea of this argument. He ſays, " its defect is indeed obvious at firſt view, " for as long as the ſenſorium ſhall continue, " according to the Immaterialiſt, in a condi- " tion to be the inſtrument, the Materialiſt " will contend, that it may be the cauſe of " thought."

I ſhall now give a very brief view of the anatomical reaſons which lead to the ſuppoſition, that the ſenſorium is the cauſe of thought.

I. What right have we to form an hypotheſis of a ſpirit, whilſt we cannot prove its exiſtence * ? What do we know of the nature or

* It is ſcarcely worth while to ſtop to anſwer the argument of ſome good people, that ſcripture ſuppoſes a ſpirit. As a metaphyſical queſtion, ſcripture ſuppoſes nothing about the matter. Scripture ſpeaks of body, ſoul, and ſpirit, and I ſuppoſe few perſons maintain that there are three diſtinct principles in man. The fact is, that ſcripture makes many other ſuppoſitions which were made at the time, or rather leaves them as it found them. It does not contradict the popular opinion, that diſorders aroſe from the influence of demons, nor many other popular opinions which are not now received by the firmeſt believers. It even

or laws of a ſpirit, which leads us to ſuppoſe that ſpirit can think, any more than matter?

II. If we form the hypotheſis of a ſpirit, how does it inhere in matter? Spirit is defined to be incorporeal and inextended. Its reſidence in the brain muſt therefore be confined to a mathematical point; and yet it muſt think by the inſtrumentality of the brain which it cannot even touch. If we adhere ſtrictly to the definitions of matter and ſpirit,

even advances ſome ſuppoſitions which could have only a popular truth, ſuch as the rainbow's being made for a particular purpoſe, the ſun ſtanding ſtill, and going back. The ſacred writings were not deſigned to teach either metaphyſics or philoſophy. It is one great proof of the wiſdom which preſided over their compoſition, that they never enter into any opinions which lay out of their way. They take popular language and ideas, merely as the vehicle of important practical truths. Had they delivered any ſpeculative opinions, they muſt have laboured under the imperfections of the times, and conſequently been leſs fit for ſucceeding times. By ſteering clear of all diſputes and parties, except ſuch as directly interfered with them, they have kept their grand object in view; and by this, among other means, they have lived to diſtant ages.—This fact, by the bye, anſwers many ingenious objections to revelation, in which their authors have triumphed much. It anſwers a great part of the late publication of a famous politician.

they have not one common property, and cannot have the leaſt connection with each other. If we relax a little, and make the totally unphiloſophical ſuppoſition that ſpirit may inhere in matter, we do not, in the leaſt, diminiſh the difficulty; for in what part of the brain does it inhere? why ſhould it inhere in one part rather than in another? The parts that have been aſſigned it are, to the laſt degree, whimſical and ridiculous. Some have ſaid that it is ſeated in the meninges. Des-Cartes ſuppoſes, that it is ſeated in the pineal gland. Dr. More thinks it is *among the animal ſpirits* in the fourth ventricle; and ſome French philoſopher maintains, that it is in the corpora ſtriata. All theſe opinions ſhew, that when their authors had made the ſuppoſition of a ſpirit, they did not know what to do with it. All ideas of fixing it in any particular place are fanciful and groundleſs; and if we ſay it is co-extended with the brain, what is this but ſaying it is material?

Beſides, to ſay nothing of our having no right to form hypotheſes unſupported by facts, of our having no right to make an addition to our frame of a ſomething which we

call

call a ſpirit, of our not knowing how or where to fix this ſpirit in matter; when we have made the attempt to ſurmount theſe inſurmountable difficulties, we have really not gained any one point, for we have no evidence that a ſpirit can think, or that it can enable matter to think. We have only, like the old geographers, ſet the earth upon an elephant; and we have to find ſome other animal upon which we muſt ſet the elephant. This ſpirit muſt, if it have any connection with matter, be ſubject to the laws of matter; and we muſt account for its operations, perfections, or imperfections, entirely according to the known laws of matter. That is, both ſpirit and matter are, in any philoſophical view of the ſubject, entirely inſtrumental in the hands of the Creator and Preſerver of Life; and we can form no ideas of any exiſtence, operations, or connections, except from what we ſee of matter, and what appears from the analogy of material objects. When we have aſſerted that matter cannot think, and that ſpirit can think, we have by no means ſolved the difficulty—it muſt come at laſt; we muſt account for all the phæno-

mena of the underſtanding; if we attempt to account for them according to any ſuppoſed mode of exiſtence or operation peculiar to a ſpirit, we are loſt immediately, for we have no data to proceed upon. The laws of matter, the ſtructure of the brain, and the analogy of other parts of the animal œconomy, will aſſiſt us in giving a plauſible account of ſome of the intellectual faculties; and if we reject this account, we cannot give any at all.

III. What becomes of the ſpirit in caſes of ſuſpended animation? Does it wait the call of ſluggiſh, inert, contemptible matter, or of the means uſed to reſtore life? If it could live while the body was apparently dead, why did it not aſſiſt its friend? How did it live while the body was apparently dead, and how does it return to the body when life returns? If it can live either in the body or out of the body, then it can not only live in two modes of exiſtence entirely different, but it can change its mode according to circumſtances.

Theſe difficulties preſs upon the immaterial ſyſtem. I now proceed to aſk, on the other hand,

IV. How

IV. How do we know that matter cannot be ſo organized as to think? Do we not ſee various ſpecies of animals that evidently poſſeſs different degrees of thought? and are not theſe degrees generally in proportion to the ſize, and probably the ſtructure of the brain? Is there any greater degree of thought poſſeſſed by man, than we may by analogy aſcribe to the greater proportion which his brain bears to the reſt of his body? If we have a cauſe adequate to the effect, is it philoſophical to ſearch for any other?

V. We learn, not only from a compariſon of man with other animals, that he may poſſeſs a ſuperior reach of thought, but we alſo learn this from a compariſon of man with man, from a view of the infinite varieties of the human ſpecies, and the ſtriking correſpondence of the intellectual faculties to the ſize and ſtructure of the brain. The doctrine of phyſiognomy has been much ridiculed, and in ſome reſpects deſervedly, becauſe of the unſcientific manner in which it has been taught, and the extravagant length to which it has been carried; but it is placed upon a moſt rational foundation, and I have

no

no doubt that we ſhall, in time, arrive at ſuch a knowledge of it as will greatly contribute to a more proper deſtination of youth, and to a more impartial judgment of mankind.

A few appearances upon the diſſection of lunatics and idiots, have thrown ſome light upon this ſubject, but they are not yet ſufficiently numerous and well authenticated.

VI. The effects of long or intenſe thinking, in exhauſting the power of thought, and inducing fatigue and weakneſs, may be accounted for, if we ſuppoſe the intellect to be material, and thought to be performed by ſome correſpondent motion of the brain; but they are utterly unaccountable upon the ſuppoſition of an immaterial principle.

VII. When the nerves of the body are moved, ideas are preſented to our minds whether we will or no, according to the different ſenſes to which thoſe nerves ſerve which are put into agitation; that is, certain ideas in the mind, ſucceeded to certain motions in the brain †. Paſſions are often excited by bodily motions; and, on the other

† Locke's Eſſay, B. II. c. 1. §. 25.

hand,

hand, when raiſed, produce changes in the body, ſome times even contrary to our volitions; for inſtance, in anger and bluſhing ‡.

VIII. The intellect keeps exact pace with the body, both in youth and age, both ſleeping and waking, both in health and ſickneſs. It ſuffers with the body from intemperance, from various accidents and diſeaſes; and it ſuffers eſpecially from thoſe diſeaſes which are more properly called nervous, ſuch as dyſpepſia, hypochondriaſis, palſy, and apoplexy. The intellect recovers with the recovery of the body. In ſhort, all its faculties appear to be governed by the laws, and to ſuffer the diſeaſes of matter.

From theſe facts I infer, that the intellect is material; and I entirely agree with Dr. Ferriar, that "great danger attends every "ſtep beyond direct inference, in reaſoning "concerning the facts of neurology."

It is not uſual, and it is ſeldom proper, to ſubjoin to the metaphyſical inveſtigation of any opinion, the practical conſequences of that opinion. I have already had occaſion to

‡ Locke's Eſſay, B. II. c. xx. §. 17.

obſerve,

obſerve, that it is the firſt maxim of every philoſopher to follow truth whitherſoever ſhe may lead him. If an opinion be true, its conſequences will be good. To regard the conſequences rather than the opinion, is either hypocriſy or puſillanimity. But ſince ſo many ſtrange conſequences have been charged upon the doctrine of Materialiſm, and ſince the ſtrange method of attempting to deter men from the reception of it by the imaginary horrors of its conſequences, has been adopted (omitting the very beneficial conſequences that would follow the general reception of this doctrine, reſpecting the moral conduct of the preſent life) I will ſtate, in very few words, what I apprehend to be the effects of the belief of the doctrines of Materialiſm, or immateriality, upon the evidence of a future ſtate. Theſe are the moſt material conſequences, and they are thoſe of which the moſt miſchievous handle has been made.

I muſt premiſe, that the ages in which incredible opinions were contentedly ſwallowed are now paſt; and I muſt not be told, that the doctrine of an immaterial principle in man, has been connected with, or led to the

belief

belief of important truths. I have to do with the preſent age, which is an age of free inquiry, and with the real conſequences of opinions accurately formed.

According to the doctrine of immateriality, the ſpirit, which cannot ſleep with the body, muſt fly off at death; it muſt exiſt in a ſeparate ſtate, and, if there be a reſurrection, it muſt be reſtored to the body. Now in all this, is there not much that is difficult of belief? Is not very ſtrong evidence required to ſupport it? and will *any evidence* ſatisfy minds of a certain caſt that it can poſſibly be true?

On the other hand, to make a doctrine more ſimple is to make it more probable. To reſtore the organization of the body, or an organization ſo far ſimilar, that perſonal identity and conſciouſneſs ſhall be preſerved, ſeems more poſſible; and it is *a priori* as probable as creation. Should we be aſked the old queſtions, how are the dead raiſed up? and with what body do they come? We have a laconic anſwer ſubjoined. But without having recourſe to this anſwer, we may philoſophically ſay, God giveth a body as it hath pleaſed

pleaſed him. The ſame materials can be of no more conſequence than the ſame ſhroud.

That we now live, and that we once did not live, are ſufficient reaſons for ſuppoſing it *poſſible* that we may live again.

Does not the doctrine of Materialiſm lay the only rational foundation for the doctrine of a reſurrection, ſuppoſing the evidence to be ſufficient?

FINIS.

Lately publiſhed,

In Octavo, Price Seven Shillings in Boards,

AN ESSAY

ON

PHILOSOPHICAL NECESSITY.

BY ALEXANDER CROMBIE, A. M.

Printed for J. Johnſon, in St. Paul's Churh yard.